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1 Introduction  
 
 
 
This article is concerned with the application of the "fundamental rules"1 
governing the awards of costs to litigation of a constitutional and/or public 
interest character.2 My interest in this topic arose from the decision on costs in 
Trustees, Biowatch Trust v Registrar: Genetic Resources (Biowatch I)3 and the 
subsequent appeal on this issue in Trustees of the time being of the Biowatch 
Trust v Registrar, Genetic Resources (Biowatch II)4
                                            
* Senior Lecturer, School of Law, University of the Witwatersrand, South Africa. Email: 
Tracy-Lynn-Field@wits.ac.za. 
1  A term used in Cilliers Law of Costs, arguably the most authoritative work on costs in 
South Africa. 
2  As my use of the sign 'and/or' implies, I am of the view that 'public interest' litigation could 
be coextensive with constitutional litigation, or not. Of course, at a certain level all 
constitutional litigation is in the public interest, but not all litigants who raise a constitutional 
issue are acting chiefly with the public interest in mind, but may rather be seeking to 
advance their own commercial or private interests – the reliance on the environmental right 
in the Constitution by the Fuel Retailers' Association in Fuel Retailers Association of 
Southern Africa v Director-General Environmental Management, Department of 
Agriculture, Conservation and Environment, Mpumalanga Province 2007 (6) SA 4 (CC) is 
a case in point. The question as to what constitutes a "public interest matter" or the criteria 
by which one determines that a party is acting in the "public interest" is a difficult one (as 
the arguments put forward in the Biowatch matter attest) that merits further elaboration. 
For the purposes of this article I can suggest a definition that emerged from a consultation 
process around the English Access to Justice Act, viz: "The potential of the proceedings to 
produce real benefits for individuals other than the client (other than benefits to the public 
at large which normally flow from proceedings of the type in question)". See Lord Justice 
Brooke 2006 JEL 348. This definition, further, resonates with the Constitutional Court's 
observation in Van der Merwe v Road Accident Fund 2006 (4) SA 230 (CC), 2006 (6) 
BCLR 682, where the court noted that while the applicant is the "immediate beneficiary of 
the outcome of the case; … it is also true that there are similarly situated people who are 
not before us. The outcome of this litigation has a wide reach and is clearly in the public 
interest" (par 78).  
3  2005 (4) SA 111 (T).  
4  TPD Case No A831/2005 unreported. 
 in which Mynhardt J 
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delivered the majority judgment (in which Molopa J concurred) 5 and Poswa J 
the minority judgment.6 An appeal against the decision of the majority has since 
been lodged by Biowatch with the Constitutional Court.7
My main argument is that the fundamental rules governing costs awards are 
not sufficient to meet new needs which arise in constitutional and/or public 
interest litigation, as the Biowatch matter illustrates, and that aspects of these 
rules need to be reframed in the light of the value framework established by the 
Constitution. While one of the primary issues in the Biowatch matter is 
ostensibly whether the courts' approach to costs in constitutional litigation 
should be characterised as a "trend" or a "rule",
 
  
8
Section 2 below outlines the content and provenance of the fundamental rules 
that form the focus of the discussion, while Section 3 considers how they have 
been applied in the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court to date. Section 4 
subsequently looks at how these rules were applied in the Biowatch matter, 
both in the court a quo and on appeal. In Section 5 I set out my reasons for 
holding that in the case of constitutional and/or public interest litigation these 
 my view is that the real issue 
is the appropriateness to constitutional and/or public interest litigation of the 
complex of existing rules that vest a discretion to award costs in the presiding 
officer, that articulate the standards by which that discretion must be exercised, 
and that prescribe the circumstances under which a higher court may interfere 
in that discretion.  
 
                                            
5  Handed down on 6 November 2007. See Trustees for the time being of The Biowatch 
Trust v Registrar Genetic Resources (A831/2005) [2007] ZAGPHC 270 www.saflii.org/za/ 
cases/ZAGPHC/toc-T.html. 
6  Handed down on 13 May 2008. See Trustees of the time being of the Biowatch Trust v 
Registrar Genetic Resources (Open Democracy Advice Centre as Amicus Curiae) (A831/ 
2005) [2008] ZAGPHC 135 www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZAGPHC/toc-T.html. 
7  During the process of peer review, the question was raised if it would not make more 
'sense' for this article to be written after the Constitutional Court judgment in the case. This 
view seems to assume that the role of the academic lawyer is confined to analysis, 
consolidation and clarification of settled law. While these are certainly important functions, 
I believe that the academic lawyer should also seek to be at the vanguard of current legal 
developments and to participate in the debates which these raise. The judgment of the 
Constitutional Court, whilst the final authority in our legal system, is not necessarily the 
final or only authority in the world of ideas.  
8  Biowatch II (Minority) par 92.  
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fundamental rules are not "fit for purpose" and set out some suggestions for 
their possible reformulation within a constitutional value framework.  
 
The issue at the heart of this paper – the question of legal costs in relation to 
access to justice – is not unique to South Africa. In this article, however, I 
eschew a comparative analysis of other jurisdictions as I believe it is important 
to provide a qualitative, in-depth analysis of how and why the rules and 
principles governing the judicial discretion to award costs were applied with 
such different outcomes in the decisions of the Biowatch matter. My aim, here, 
is to articulate the assumptions and values underlying the exercise of the 
discretion, and to question whether or not these are in line with constitutional 
values.9
2 Fundamental Rules Governing Costs  
  
 
 
For the purposes of this article, the complex of rules governing costs comprises 
four dimensions: (1) the traditional principles applicable to costs orders (the first 
of which is that an award of costs is in the discretion of the court of first 
instance) and their relationship; (2) the requirement that the court's discretion 
be exercised judicially; (3) the test for interference in the discretion of the court 
a quo; and (4), closely related to this, the characterisation of the nature of the 
judicial discretion to award costs in both the court a quo and court of appeal 
and the underlying rationale thereof. A closer examination of the rules and 
principles within each area is required.  
 
                                            
9  For a comparative analysis of costs in relation to access to courts in the United States, 
United Kingdom and Germany see Hirte 1991 ICLQ 91. For a recent consideration of the 
issue in the context of environmental litigation see Working Group on Access to 
Environmental Justice 2008 JPEL 1253. For a fairly comprehensive comparative overview 
of the treatment of costs in public interest litigation see also Biowatch II (Minority) par 43-
53.  
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2.1 Two principles and their relationship  
The two principles which have governed costs orders in South African law since 
the earliest time10 are, firstly, that the court of first instance has a judicial 
discretion to award costs and secondly, that costs follow the event in that the 
successful party is usually awarded costs. Cilliers refers to these principles as 
the "basic rule" and "general rule" respectively,11
As Cilliers himself concedes, these principles exist in a "curious" relationship. 
Lying at the heart of this curious relationship is the paradox of holding that a 
judicial officer of first instance has the discretion to make a costs award whilst 
at the same time apparently prescribing how that discretion should be 
exercised. The tension has been managed in two ways. Firstly, there is an 
extensive body of precedent in support of the rule that the second principle 
yields to the first.
 but following the 
nomenclature used in the Biowatch cases I will refer to them as the first and 
second principle.  
 
12 As a result, the nature of the judicial discretion in the court a 
quo has been described as "very wide"13 or "overriding".14 However, it is not 
surprising to find judicial officers then maintaining that the discretion is wide and 
unfettered15 although there is also a large body of case law maintaining that the 
discretion is not unfettered.16 17
                                            
10  See for instance Lord De Villiers CJ's opening remarks in Fripp v Gibbon 1913 AD 354, 
357.  
11  Cilliers (n 1) § 2.01. For case law citing the basic rule or first principle see Cilliers (n 1) § 
2.03 note 1, and for the second principle § 2.08 note 1. On the relationship between the 
first and second principles see § 2.05. 
12  Ibid § 2.03 note 4.  
13  K & S Dry Cleaning Equipment v South African Eagle Insurance 2001 (3) SA 652 (W) at 
668G.  
14  Griffiths v Mutual & Federal Insurance 1994 (1) SA 535 (A). 
15  As per Mynhardt J in Biowatch II (Majority) par 21.  
16  Cilliers (n 1) § 2.04 note 6. The cases noted by Cilliers as contra in fact affirm that the 
discretion is not unfettered.  
 
17  This tension was already evident in the very early decision of Fripp v Gibbon where De 
Villiers JP had held: "Discretion implies latitude, and it cannot affect the matter that the 
members of this Court, or some of them, might have arrived at a different conclusion … 
[I]n my view it is undesirable to lay down any hard and fast rules for the guidance of 
magistrates to which they will be expected to conform in the absence of exceptional 
circumstances. Where the law has given the magistrate absolute discretion, free and 
unfettered by any rules, it is not for the Court to lay down rules which, while purporting to 
guide him, will only have the effect of fettering his discretion" (n 10 above at 363-364, my 
emphasis). In the same matter, Lord de Villiers CJ held that "[t]he discretion of such Court, 
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The second approach towards reconciling the two principles was put forward in 
Levben Products (Pvt) Ltd v Alexander Films (SA) (Pty) Ltd18 where Murray CJ 
proposed that where the first principle must be exercised "upon grounds which 
a reasonable man could have come to the conclusion arrived at", the second 
principle should not be departed from "without the existence of good grounds 
for doing so".19 The judge did not put forward any other criteria by which to 
evaluate "good grounds", although his statement is authority for the proposition 
that a departure from the second principle must be justified. The question of 
who is the successful party in a case, a question that is not without 
considerable complexity at times, is therefore primarily relevant for determining 
if there has been a departure from the second principle. Apart from the "good 
grounds" referred to by Murray CJ there are many High Court decisions in 
which it was held that a judge may depart from the second principle only if 
"special circumstances" are present.20
                                                                                                                               
therefore, is not unlimited, and there are numerous cases in which courts of appeal have 
set aside judgments as to costs where such judgments have contravened the general 
principle that to the successful party should be awarded his costs" (Ibid 357-358). And 
Solomon JA, noting the 'rule' towards the award of costs in claims of convention and 
reconvention in the Transvaal and English courts, stated: "That rule, however, is not a rigid 
one, but may be departed from in special circumstances. And it is only, in my opinion, 
where there are such special circumstances, that there is room for the exercise of any 
discretion by the judge or magistrate' (Ibid 360-361).  
18  1957 (4) SA 225 (SR).  
19  Ibid at 227B–D.  
20  Cilliers (n 1) § 2.08 note 2. 
 Because these precedents have not 
emanated from the Appellate Division or Supreme Court of Appeal, however, 
the standard of accountability that applies where a judge departs from the 
second principle is not clearly specified in our law.  
 
Further, given that the larger body of authority sits behind the rule that the 
second principle yields to the first, the proposition that ultimately emerges is 
that costs are in the judicial discretion of the judge of first instance. Even if the 
courts' present approach to costs in constitutional and/or public interest matters 
was acknowledged as a new, third principle of the same status as the second 
principle, it would not trump the first principle but would rather have to yield to it, 
if the current understanding of the relationship between the first and second 
principle is retained.  
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2.2 Judicial exercise of discretion  
The most frequently employed descriptor of the nature of the discretion is that it 
must be exercised "judicially" which essentially means "not arbitrarily".21 In 
Fripp v Gibbon De Villiers JP held that "[The presiding officer] should take into 
consideration the circumstances of each case, carefully weighing the various 
issues in the case, the conduct of the parties and any other circumstance which 
may have a bearing upon the question of costs and then make such order as to 
costs as would be fair and just between the parties".22
2.3 Test for interference in the discretion of the court a quo  
 The judicial exercise of a 
discretion thus entails taking into account circumstances "which may have a 
bearing upon the question of costs" (although no parameters for identifying 
relevant from irrelevant circumstances are established) and trying to act in a 
manner that is fair to both sides.  
 
The test for interference in the discretion of the court a quo was foreshadowed 
in the dictum of De Villiers JP in Fripp v Gibbon where he held that if the 
presiding officer indeed weighs all issues in the case and makes an order as to 
costs that is fair and just between the parties "and does not act capriciously or 
upon any wrong principle, I know of no right on the part of a court of appeal to 
interfere with the honest exercise of his discretion".23
The most recent formulation of the test which subsequently crystallised
 
 
24 
occurred in Naylor & another v Jansen25
Where the law has given a Judge an unfettered discretion, it is not for this Court to 
lay down rules which, while purporting to guide the Judge, will have the effect only 
of fettering the discretion. If, therefore, there are factors which the trial Court, in the 
exercise of its discretion does decide to take into account so as to reach a different 
 (commonly known as Naylor II) where 
Cloete JA held:  
 
                                            
21  Cilliers (n 1) § 2.04 note 3.  
22  N 10 above 363.  
23  Ibid at 363. 
24  See, for instance, Penny v Walker 1936 AD 241 at 260; Rondalia Assurance Corporation 
of SA v Page 1975 (1) SA 708 (A) at 720C; Protea Assurance v Matinise 1978 (1) SA 963 
(A) at 976 G–H; Kilian v Geregsbode, Uitenhage 1980 (1) SA 808 (A) 815-816 and 
Attorney-General, Eastern Cape v Blom 1988 (4) SA 645 (A) at 670D–F. 
25  2007 (1) SA 16 (SCA). 
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result, a Court of appeal is not entitled to interfere – even although it may or 
probably would have given a different order. The reason is that the discretion 
exercised by the Court's giving the order is not a "broad discretion" (or a 
"discretion in the wide sense" or a "discretion loosely so called") which obliges the 
Court of first instance to have regard to a number of features in coming to its 
conclusion, and where a Court of appeal is at liberty to decide the matter 
according to its own view of the merits and to substitute its decision for the 
decision of the Court below, simply because it considers its conclusion more 
appropriate. The discretion is a discretion in the strict or narrow sense (also called 
a "strong" or a "true" discretion). In such a case, the power to interfere on appeal is 
limited to cases in which it is found that the Court vested with the discretion did not 
exercise the discretion judicially, which can be done by showing that the Court of 
first instance exercised the power conferred upon it capriciously or upon a wrong 
principle, or did not bring its unbiased judgment to bear on the question or did not 
act for substantial reasons.26
Further on in the judgment Cloete J emphasised that there is no "normal rule" 
applicable to the exercise of a discretion by a trial judge to award costs. The 
fact that a judge follows a particular approach to the award of costs creates no 
precedent binding on judges called upon to exercise such a discretion in 
exactly the same set of circumstances in future. The exercise of a narrow 
discretion involves a "choice between permissible alternatives" and, therefore 
"different judicial officers, acting reasonably, could legitimately come to different 
conclusions on identical facts".
 
 
27
2.4 The characterisation of the discretion 
  
 
The distinction between a "broad" and a "narrow" judicial discretion which 
Cloete J recalled in Naylor II is a deeply-rooted feature of the law governing the 
relationship between appeal courts and courts of first instance and is one that is 
not confined to the question of costs. In Tjospomie Boerdery (Pty) Ltd v 
Drakensburg Botteliers (Pty) Ltd28
                                            
26  Naylor II par 14.  
27  Naylor II par 28, quoting Ganes v Telecom Namibia 2004 (3) SA 615 (SCA) par 21.  
28  1989 (4) SA 31 (T), [1989] 4 All SA 228. 
 Stegmann J traced the differences between, 
and casuistic development of, the two types of discretion. The issue at hand in 
the Tjospomie case was whether an order made by the court of first instance 
for the winding-up of a company was "just and equitable" as contemplated in 
section 344 (h) of the Companies Act 61 of 1973 and one of the first legal 
issues that arose was the nature of the appeal in the case. The court had been 
referred to two apparently antithetical precedents: Mahomed v Kazi's Agencies 
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(Pty) Ltd,29 in which it had been held that an appeal court's power under a 
similar provision of the Companies Act of 1926 was one in which a court of 
appeal was in as good a position as the court below to exercise the discretion 
anew; and Ex Parte Neethling,30 in which the discretion exercisable under 
section 87 of the Administration of Estates Act 24 of 1913 was characterised as 
one where its function was not simply to substitute its discretion for that of the 
court below, but rather to consider the prior question whether the court below 
had or had not exercised its discretion judicially. Stegmann J held that there 
was in fact no essential antithesis between these two cases and that a correct 
statement of the law was as follows: Courts are called upon to exercise 
discretions which vary infinitely in their nature and it is impossible to formulate a 
general principle to govern all cases where the exercise of a discretion by a 
court is brought on appeal.31 There is therefore no general principle to the 
effect that a court of appeal is always precluded from substituting its own 
decision for that of the trial court unless the latter can be shown to have been 
vitiated by a failure to exercise the discretion judicially. Rather, the question is 
to be approached casuistically and "there are particular categories of cases in 
which interference by a court of appeal with the exercise of a discretionary 
power by a court below is conditional upon the appellant's establishing a failure 
on the part of the court below to exercise the discretion judicially".32
According to Greenberg JA in Ex Parte Neethling, the question of costs 
(together with postponements, an amendment of pleadings and alteration of 
sentence) had previously been held to fall within this category of cases.
 Although it 
is merely a technical point, it should be noted that in the case of the law of 
costs, the discretion is therefore wide on the part of the presiding officer, whilst 
the discretion to interfere in that discretion on the part of an appeal court is 
narrow. 
 
33
                                            
29  1949 (1) SA 1162 (N). 
30  1951 (4) SA 331 (A).  
31  Tjospomie (n 28) at 35I.  
32  Ibid at 35G–H. 
33  Ex Parte Neethling (n 30) at 335D–E. In Tjospomie (note 26 above) Stegmann J lists 
matters which were subsequently decided to fall within this category of cases at 37F–I. 
 
Dealing with the contention that the courts' approach in such cases reduced the 
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right of appeal to that of a review, Greenberg JA held that "the true position is 
that there is a right of appeal but in cases of this kind the Appeal Court, 
because of the nature of the case, has only a limited power of correction".34
The identification of the question of costs with this category of cases took place 
in Rex v Zackey
 
 
35 where Greenberg JA had referred to, in particular, De Villiers 
JP's dicta in Fripp v Gibbon.36 Here De Villiers' JP had held that "[q]uestions of 
costs are always important and sometimes complex and difficult to determine, 
and in leaving the magistrate a discretion the law contemplates that he should 
take into consideration the circumstances of each case …".37 The underlying 
rationale for characterising the question of costs in this manner is implied in this 
statement but stated more explicitly in Neugebauer & Co Ltd v Herman38 where 
Innes CJ, in refusing to make a special order as to costs, said that "The matter 
was one with which [the presiding officer] was in the best position to deal".39
3 Constitutional Court's Application of the Fundamental Rules to 
Constitutional Litigation
 It 
is because the judge of first instance sits at the coalface of the dispute and 
experiences the complexities of the suit and the conduct of the parties (and 
where relevant their witnesses at first hand) that he or she is best positioned to 
make a fair order as to costs.  
 
 
40
The Constitutional Court had occasion in Ferreira v Levin NO (2)
 
41
The Supreme Court has, over the years, developed a flexible approach to costs 
which proceeds from two basic principles, the first being that the award of costs, 
 to consider 
the application of the traditional principles relating to the award of costs to 
constitutional litigation. Here Ackermann J stated: 
 
                                            
34  Ex Parte Neethling note 30 above at 335 G–H.  
35  1945 AD 505 at 513.  
36  N 10 above.  
37  Ibid 363.  
38  1923 AD 564. 
39  Ibid at 575. 
40  See, in general, Friedman "Costs" ch 6. 
41  1996 (2) SA 61 (CC), 1996 (4) BCLR 441.  
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unless expressly otherwise enacted, is in the discretion of the presiding judicial 
officer and the second that the successful party should, as a general rule, have his 
or her costs. Even this second principle is subject to the first. The second principle 
is subject to a large number of exceptions where the successful party is deprived 
of his or her costs. Without attempting either comprehensiveness or complete 
analytical accuracy, depriving successful parties of their costs can depend on 
circumstances such as, for example, the conduct of parties, the conduct of their 
legal representatives, whether a party achieves technical success only, the nature 
of the litigants and the nature of the proceedings. I mention these examples to 
indicate that the principles which have been developed in relation to the award of 
costs are by their nature sufficiently flexible and adaptable to meet new needs 
which may arise in regard to constitutional litigation. They offer a useful point of 
departure. If the need arises the rules may have to be substantially adapted; this 
should however be done on a case by case basis. It is unnecessary, if not 
impossible, at this stage to attempt to formulate comprehensive rules regarding 
costs in constitutional litigation.42
Over time, the Constitutional Court has developed a fairly consistent position on 
the award of costs in constitutional litigation. For instance, where the applicant 
– the individual or entity contending for the protection of constitutional rights – is 
successful, costs follow the result. Where, however, the respondent is 
successful, a government entity will not receive its costs if the applicant raised 
an important constitutional issue against it. In Motsepe v Commissioner for 
Inland Affairs
 
 
The overriding import of this pronouncement is to uphold the primacy of the first 
principle – the judicial discretion to award costs – without binding that discretion 
in any way. Thus although the second principle is recognised, it is subject to the 
first. Further, the reasons upon which a judge may depart from the second 
principle are, seemingly, not subject to any moral order; i.e. a reason relating to 
the conduct of the parties is just as good as one relating to the nature of the 
litigants or the nature of the proceedings. Ackermann's reluctance to formulate 
'"comprehensive rules" that would impede the casuistic development of the 
traditional principles on costs in the context of constitutional litigation is perhaps 
understandable, however, given that this case was heard very near the start of 
the Constitutional Court's existence.  
 
43
                                            
42  Ibid par 3.  
43  1997 (2) SA 898 (CC), 1997 (6) BCLR 692.  
 Ackermann J stated that "one should be cautious in awarding 
costs against litigants who seek to enforce their constitutional right against the 
state, particularly where the constitutionality of a statutory provision is attacked, 
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lest such orders have an unduly inhibiting or 'chilling' effect on other potential 
litigants in this category".44 45 On certain occasions, the court has extended this 
particular "principle" to costs orders in which the respondents were private 
companies.46
Moving a step beyond a refusal to mulct an unsuccessful party with costs, in 
certain exceptional circumstances the Constitutional Court has even ordered 
the state or state institutions to pay the costs of unsuccessful parties, simply on 
the basis that the unsuccessful parties raised important constitutional issues
 
 
47 
or on the basis that mulcting the unsuccessful party with costs would 
undermine another important objective.48
                                            
44  Ibid par 30.  
45  Friedman (n 40) 6–2 with particular reference to the case-law quoted in note 6. See also 
Steenkamp v Provincial Tender Board Eastern Cape 2007 (3) SA 121 (CC), 2007 (3) 
BCLR 300 par 62, Armbruster v Minister of Finance 2007 (6) SA 550 (CC), 2007 (12) 
BCLR 1283 par 82, Chirwa v Transnet 2008 (4) SA 367 (CC), 2008 (3) BCLR 251 par 78. 
Interestingly in MEC: Department of Agriculture, Conservation and Environment v HTF 
Developers 2008 (2) SA 319 (CC), 2008 (4) BCLR 417 the applicant department tendered 
the costs of the appeal, which raised an important interpretive issue that required 
resolution, irrespective of the outcome (par 55).  
46  Ibid 6-2–6-3 with reference to SACCAWU v Irvin & Johnson (Seafoods Division Fish 
Processing) 2000 (3) SA 705 (CC). See also Giddey v JC Barnard 2007 (5) SA 525 (CC), 
2007(2) BCLR 125 par 35. 
47  Gory v Kolver (Starke intervening) 2007 (4) SA 97 (CC), 2007 (3) BCLR 249 par 65, Union 
of Refugee Women v Director: Private Security Industry Regulatory Authority 2007 (4) SA 
395 (CC), 2007 (4) BCLR 339.  
48  See MEC for Education: KwaZulu Natal, Thulani Cele: School Liaison Officer, Anne 
Martin: Principal of Durban Girls' High School, Fiona Knight: Chairperson of the Governing 
Body of Durban Girls' High School v Navaneethum Pillay, Governing Body Foundation, 
Natal Tamil Vedic Society Trust, Freedom of Expression Institute 2008 (2) BCLR 99 (CC) 
where the court found that while the school, as one of the appellants, had been 
unsuccessful, it had been at the centre of a difficult constitutional issue and had played an 
important role in ventilating a constitutional issue. Moreover, if ordered to pay the costs of 
the respondents, the funds would be diverted from being otherwise spent on learners. As 
such, the Department was required to bear the full burden of costs towards the 
respondents (par 118).  
 
 
The problem with these "principles" for the potential constitutional litigant, 
however, is their very flexibility, because there have also been cases in which 
the Constitutional Court has not refrained from making a costs order against 
litigants who unsuccessfully sought to ventilate a constitutional issue – the 
Motsepe case being one in point. Here Ackermann had continued as follows:  
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This cautious approach cannot, however, be allowed to develop into an inflexible 
rule so that litigants are induced into believing that they are free to challenge the 
constitutionality of statutory provisions in this court, no matter how spurious the 
grounds for doing so may be or how remote the possibility that this court will grant 
them access. This can neither be in the interests of the administration of justice 
nor fair to those who are forced to oppose such attacks.49
So far, I have looked at costs granted by the Constitutional Courts in 
proceedings before it. What of its position on costs orders made by the 
Supreme Court of Appeal or High Courts? The Constitutional Court has 
affirmed the traditional test for interference
 
 
Notwithstanding that the overwhelming majority of the Constitutional Court's 
decisions affirm the principle that a party who raises an important constitutional 
issue but is unsuccessful should not be mulcted in costs, a precedent like 
Motsepe indicates that, ultimately, the decision still lies squarely with the 
presiding officer, who is not bound to follow this principle; i.e. the "constitutional 
principle", if you like, stands in a similar relationship to the first principle on 
costs as does the second principle. Further, the Constitutional Court has not 
expressly indicated the formal or substantive criteria that should apply when a 
judge departs from the "constitutional principle". 
 
50 and, where it has found that the 
court misdirected itself, has interfered in the costs order.51 Where is has done 
this, it has also implicitly accepted the characterisation of costs issues as 
narrow in the court of appeal.52 However, beginning with Sanderson v Attorney-
General, Eastern Cape53 and subsequently in ANC v Minister of Local 
Government and Housing , KwaZulu-Natal,54 Van der Merwe Road Accident 
Fund,55 Department of Land Affairs v Goedgeleden Tropical Fruits (Pty) Ltd,56
                                            
49  Motsepe (n 43) par 30.  
50  See the cases cited in Friedman (n 40) 6–9 note 5. 
51  See Swartbooi v Brink 2006 (1) SA 203 (CC), 2006 (5) BCLR 502 (CC) where the 
Constitutional Court found that the High Court had failed to take into account legislation 
providing immunity to councilors from civil proceedings and had thus materially 
misdirected itself. The Constitutional Court was therefore free to consider the costs issue 
afresh (par 23) and in the event rejected the High Court's approach (par 25).  
52  See also Premier, Province of Mpumalanga v Executive Committee of the Association of 
Governing Bodies of State-aided Schools: Eastern Transvaal 1999 (2) SA 91 (CC), 1999 
(2) BCLR 151 par 53. For the affirmation of the characterisation in other contexts see 
Justice O Regan's comments in Giddey (n 46) notes 16 and 17. 
53  1998 (2) SA 38 (CC), 1997 (12) BCLR 1675 par 44.  
54  1998 (3) SA 1 (CC), 1998 (4) BCLR 399 par 34. 
55  N 2 above par 78.  
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Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road, Berea Township v City of Johannesburg,57 Njongi 
v Member of the Executive Council, Department of Welfare, Eastern Cape58
[T]he Supreme Court of Appeal ordered the claimants and the Department to pay 
costs jointly and severally including costs attendant upon the use of two counsel. 
The applicants have raised an important matter of land restitution and have 
succeeded in this Court. I can find no reason why this Court should not set aside 
the costs order of the Supreme Court of Appeal.
 the 
Constitutional Court has indicated or simply implied that the principle that an 
unsuccessful party who raises an important constitutional issue should not be 
mulcted in costs applies equally to other courts and has interfered in costs 
orders made by the Supreme Court of Appeal or High Courts. Importantly, the 
Constitutional Court's interference in these costs orders was not dependant on 
a prior enquiry according to the traditional test for judicial interference and the 
justification given was usually simply a reference to the demands of justice and 
equity, if any justification was given at all. In the Goedgelegen case, the 
Constitutional Court for instance simply stated: 
 
59
This is an appropriate case in which the City should be ordered to pay the costs of 
the applicants. The proceedings would have been obviated if there had been 
meaningful engagement before the case had been started. In the circumstances 
the City should also pay the applicants' costs in the High Court and in the 
Supreme Court of Appeal.
 
 
And in the Olivia Road case the court's words were:  
 
60
It is notable that in these cases the Constitutional Court found no difficulty in 
setting aside the costs orders in the lower courts. No reference, for instance, 
was made to the traditional test for interference in these orders and no 
elaborated justification was given when interference actually took place. The 
Constitutional Court's boldness in setting aside these costs orders is 
commendable but the lack of an account weakens the jurisprudential basis of 
this development. 
 
 
                                                                                                                               
56  2007 (6) SA 199 (CC), 2007 (10) BCLR 1027 par 88.  
57  2008 (4) SA 237 (CC), 2008 (5) BCLR 475 par 53. 
58  2008 (4) SA 237 (CC), 2008 (6) BCLR 571. See the court's extensive justification for 
ordering that the provincial department pay all of the costs of the applicant in the High 
Court (both a quo and on appeal), the Supreme Court of Appeal and the Constitutional 
Court from par 61–91.  
59  Goedgelegen case (n 56) par 88.  
60  Olivia Road case (n 57) par 53.  
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While the Constitutional Court has not made an express pronouncement on the 
propriety of the reasons which may be put forward to justify costs orders, it is 
interesting to note that in Swartbooi v Brink61
4 Costs issue in the Biowatch matter  
 the court found that the High 
Court's approach and purpose towards the costs order was improper because 
the costs order was apparently aimed at teaching the councilors involved in the 
litigation a lesson and attempting to influence the way in which they made 
similar decisions in future. It impinged upon the executive domain and thus on 
the separation of powers. This decision could therefore be used to justify the 
proposition that in making costs orders certain reasons could be improper or 
inappropriate in the light of the value framework established by the Constitution. 
 
 
4.1 Nature of the litigation  
It is firstly important to note that the issues raised in Biowatch I were of a 
constitutional nature. The trustees of the Biowatch Trust brought an application 
for access to information relating to genetically-modified organisms (GMOs) 
held by the first respondent, being the Registrar: Genetic Resources; and the 
second respondent, being the Executive Council for Genetically Modified 
Organisms (the statutory respondents).62 The Minister of Agriculture had been 
joined as a third respondent, while the fourth to sixth respondents, being 
Monsanto South Africa (Pty) Ltd, Stoneville Pedigreed Seed Company and 
D&PL South Africa respectively, had intervened in the application at a later 
stage. The fourth to sixth respondents were all private biotechnology 
companies with varying levels of interest in the South African GMO market. The 
requests were made between the date that the Promotion of Access to 
Information Act 2 of 2000 (PAIA) was promulgated (2 February 2000), and the 
date it entered into force (9 March 2001).63
                                            
61  N 51 above.  
62  Biowatch I par 1.  
63  Par 18. 
 In its application Biowatch therefore 
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relied not on PAIA but on section 32(1)(a) of the Constitution64 together with the 
access to information provisions in NEMA (section 31(3)(c)(iii) and (v)) and the 
Genetically Modified Organisms Act 15 of 1997 (section 18).65
Secondly, although this matter was placed in dispute by the respondents, all of 
the judges in the matter either accepted or concluded that Biowatch was indeed 
acting in the public interest.
 
 
66 In my view Biowatch I was clearly a public 
interest matter. Biowatch maintained that it sought access to information held 
by the State in order to further its objective of protecting the right of everyone to 
an environment that is not harmful to their health or well-being and to have the 
environment protected for present and future generations.67 In particular, it 
sought this information in fulfilment of its role as a 'watchdog' in respect of the 
use, control and release of GMOs in South Africa. Its capacity to access and 
use the information sought therefore held potential benefits for consumers who 
were not before the court as well as for the environment, which factor accords 
with the Constitutional Court's description of public interest matter in the Van 
der Merwe case.68
                                            
64  S 32(1) of the Constitution provides that "(1) Everyone has the right of access to- (a) any 
information held by the state; (b) any information that is held by another person and that is 
required for the exercise or protection of any rights."  
65  Par 2.  
66  On the issue of whether Biowatch had acted in the public interest, Mynhardt J in Biowatch 
II (Majority) had been prepared, like the court a quo, to "accept" that Biowatch had indeed 
acted in the public interest in instituting the proceedings (par 38). In contrast, Poswa J, 
after an exhaustive review of the founding affidavits and the respondents' responses, 
found that (Biowatch II, Minority, par 12): "[I]t is evident that the appellant was, in 
approaching the statutory respondents for information, actuated by genuine concerns 
about public interest. It is also important, in my view, to highlight that the fourth respondent 
[Monsanto] vehemently and relentlessly disputed that Biowatch was acting in the public 
interest … I seek further to emphasise and illustrate that, unlike the court a quo and the 
majority judgment in this Court, I do not merely accept that the applicant acted in the public 
interest but find that it demonstrated that with convincing evidence. In my view, the fact 
that the fourth respondent denied that the appellant was acting in the public interest is not 
a matter of mere observation. It went into great detail to support its submission in that 
regard. A finding that Biowatch has standing and is acting in the public interest is, in my 
view, a comprehensive success by Biowatch and a comprehensive loss by the fourth 
respondent". (Judge's emphasis.) 
67  The rights protected in s 24 of the Constitution.  
68  See n 2 above.  
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4.2 Success of the parties in the court a quo  
On the face of it, the merits of the case related to Biowatch's right to the 
information to which it sought access, and if the Registrar's failure to furnish 
such information constituted a continued infringement of Biowatch's rights 
under section 32(1)(a) of the Constitution. Much of the judgment, however, was 
concerned with the array of defences brought by the phalanx of lawyers 
representing the first to sixth respondents, which included:69 (1) The 
applicability of PAIA to the matter together with Biowatch's failure to comply 
with such provisions (and a variety of sub-issues relating to this);70
Dunn AJ in the court a quo summarised the outcome of the case in relation to 
these issues as follows:
 (2) 
Biowatch's failure to exhaust the internal appeal remedy in the GMO Act; (3) 
the alleged commercial confidentiality of the information sought by Biowatch; 
and (4) Biowatch's failure to articulate properly the information to which it 
sought access.  
 
71
Dunn AJ's use of the word "some" implies a partial victory on the part of 
Biowatch and does not reflect the fact that in respect of the legal issues raised 
in the case, Biowatch was indeed the overwhelmingly successful party.
 
 
Biowatch has, in my view, established that it has a clear right to some of the 
information to which access was and is now requested; that the Registrar's failure 
to grant it access to such information as it was legally entitled to, constituted a 
continued infringement of Biowatch's rights under section 32(1)(a) of the 
Constitution; that Biowatch had no alternative remedy to enforce its rights; that 
Biowatch should not be non-suited for the inept manner in which the information 
sought in its fourth request, as well as in its notice of motion, is formulated, and 
that the Registrar would be entitled to refuse access to certain records, or parts 
thereof, in terms of the grounds for refusal contained in ch 4 of Part 2 of PAIA. (My 
emphasis.) 
 
72
                                            
69  See Biowatch I par 24.  
70  Dunn AJ points to the range of sub-issues encompassed by this question in note 26 of the 
judgment.  
71  Biowatch I par 66.  
72  A summary of Dunn AJ's decisions on these issues and sub-issues (together with an 
assessment of the winning party in parentheses) is as follows:  
 
• In regard to the issue of the applicability of PAIA, he found that PAIA did not operate 
retrospectively and that its requests for information should not be invalidated simply 
because they were not made in terms of, and did not comply with, PAIA – Biowatch 
(Biowatch I par 29). 
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Indeed, the only legal issue on which the respondents achieved any substantial 
success was the retrospective applicability of Part 2, Chapter 4 of PAIA, which 
could thus be relied upon by the Registrar as grounds to refuse Biowatch 
access to the information.  
 
Biowatch's success on the legal issues, however, was clouded by the issue that 
arose in connection with their actual requests for information – namely, that the 
requests, both in their original formulation and in the notice of motion, were 
apparently vexatious and made in an inept manner. Prior to launching the 
litigation, Biowatch had submitted four requests for information to the Registrar 
pertaining to the use of GMOs in South Africa, which were not fully granted.73
                                                                                                                               
• He rejected the argument, advanced by Monsanto, that Biowatch's right of access to 
information crystallised only when it launched its court application (on 22 August 2002 
by which time PAIA had entered into force), finding that they crystallised on each of 
the occasions Biowatch submitted a request for information to the Registrar – 
Biowatch (Biowatch I par 30). 
 
• He rejected the argument that Biowatch should have exhausted the internal appeal 
procedures in PAIA – Biowatch (Biowatch I par 32). 
• He rejected the argument, advanced by the first to third respondents and Monsanto, 
that Biowatch should have exhausted the internal appeal procedures in the GMO Act 
– Biowatch (Biowatch I par 38). 
• On the argument advanced by Stoneville that s 31 of NEMA limited Biowatch's right of 
access to information under s 32 of the Constitution, he found that Biowatch's 
attempts to rely on s 31 of NEMA were misplaced because these provisions in NEMA 
ceased to apply the moment PAIA was promulgated and that for this reason alone s 
31 could not constitute a permissible limitation on Biowatch's rights under s 32 – 
Biowatch (Biowatch I par 36). 
• Similarly, on the argument that Biowatch's s 32 right was limited by s 18 of the GMO 
Act, he found – contrary to the submissions advanced by Stoneville – that interpreting 
s 18(1)(a) in a manner that did not limit the right of access to information was in 
keeping with the approach to interpretation required by the Constitution – Biowatch 
(Biowatch I par 37). 
• On the commercial confidentiality of some of the information requested, he found that 
PAIA could apply retrospectively to the degree that the Registrar could rely on the 
provisions of Part 2, Chapter 4 as grounds for refusing access to the information – 
Respondents (Biowatch I par 41). 
• He further found that the strict standard that applies to the intelligible identification of 
documents during a process of litigation, as embodied in Rules 35(14) and 38(1) of 
the Uniform Rules of Court, did not apply to a request for information under s 32 of 
the Constitution and that Biowatch should not be non-suited on the excessive breadth 
of its requests for information alone – Biowatch (Biowatch I par 43-44). 
73  The nature of Biowatch's requests and the Registrar's response thereto are set out in 
detail in Biowatch I par 18-23. The information Biowatch sought related to: Risk 
assessments accompanying requests for trial and commercial releases of GMOs, permits 
and approvals granted in terms of the GMO Act including information in such 
authorisations on the methods and plans for monitoring GMOs and for emergency 
measures in the case of an accident; details of public participation relating to the granting 
of authorisations in terms of the GMO Act; the location of field trials and commercial 
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Reflecting, perhaps, Biowatch's frustration with the fact that many aspects of 
these requests for information were either ignored or overlooked by the first 
respondent, the fourth request was particularly exhaustive as regards the 
information to which access was sought.74 Rather than precisely listing the 
information to which it sought access in its notice of motion, Biowatch simply 
attached the records of its four attempts to correspond with and elicit 
information from the statutory respondents. Although Dunn AJ did not non-suit 
Biowatch because of the excessive breadth of its requests for information, he 
found some substance in the respondents' submissions that its requests for 
information were inherently vague, vexatious, oppressive and amounted to a 
"fishing expedition". He nevertheless acknowledged that requesters for 
information under section 32(1)(a) of the Constitution would often not have 
knowledge of the precise description of the record to which access is sought, 
and that a duty rested on the Registrar to adopt an active role in ascertaining 
the records to which access was sought.75 In regard to the 'inept' manner in 
which Biowatch had approached the court, he complained:76
He nevertheless proceeded with the task of determining which of the items in 
the first to fourth requests were valid and justifiable. Essentially, he found that 
all of the items in the first to third requests had either already been granted or 
  
 
Unfortunately, Biowatch also did not engage in the task of specifying in its notice 
of motion the precise list of information it seeks access to. Its approach seems to 
have been to expect the respondents and the court to read through all the 
correspondence and to divine precisely what information is requested and what 
information is outstanding. 
 
                                                                                                                               
releases; registered academic and research institutions; minutes of the meetings of the 
Executive Council and the Advisory Committee established in terms of the GMO Act; and 
details of persons represented on the Advisory Committee.  
74  The content of this correspondence is set out in par 23. An appreciation of the exhaustive 
nature of these requests is perhaps best illustrated by items (ii), (ix) and (x) of the 
schedule which read as follows:  
(ii) All data relating to RR wheat. 
… 
(ix) Copies of all internal, inter-departmental, inter-State departmental and/or 
external letters, telefaxes, e-mails, circulars, memoranda and similar documents 
which relate to the development, production, use and application of GMOs. 
(x) Any other recorded information held by the State relating to the development, 
production, use and application of GMOs.  
75  Biowatch I par 43. 
76  Ibid par 42. 
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were encompassed in the fourth request and that reference to the first to third 
requests in the notice of motion was therefore entirely unnecessary.77 He then 
examined the eleven items of information listed in a Schedule to the fourth 
request, essentially finding that three of them were impermissibly vague or 
overly broad. Biowatch accordingly had a right to the other eight items, subject 
to the right of the Registrar to refuse access on the basis of Part 2, Chapter 4 of 
PAIA.78
On appeal, the majority and minority decisions differed on the extent of 
Biowatch's success. While both Mynhardt J and Poswa J seemed to agree that 
Biowatch was the successful party as against the statutory respondents 
(although Mynhardt J placed hardly any emphasis on this whereas Poswa J 
expressly affirmed it
 
 
79), they differed on Biowatch's success vis-à-vis 
Monsanto. Mynhardt J went to some lengths80 to argue that Monsanto was the 
successful party against Biowatch on the basis of Dunn AJ's finding on the 
retrospective application of Chapter 4, Part 2 of PAIA, referring to this fact no 
less than three times in the introductory part of his judgment.81 In contrast, 
Poswa J argued that Biowatch was the successful party against Monsanto, 
relying on Dunn AJ's own summary of the judgment82
                                            
77  Ibid par 45-50.  
78  Ibid par 52-65. Was Biowatch successful then as regards its actual requests for access to 
information? On the basis of the judge's finding on those requests that were necessary for 
purposes of citing in the notice of motion, they were successful on eight out of eleven 
items (a success rate of some 72%). However, a more formalistic approach would take 
into account those items of information formulated in the first to third requests, which were 
dismissed as unnecessary by the judge. If one construes dismissal as failure, then 
Biowatch's success rate as regards its actual information requests was lower. However, 
given that Dunn AJ found that most of the items in the first to third requests were 
incorporated in the fourth request, this approach – in my view – is overly technical and 
inaccurate. In the case of its actual requests for information, Biowatch was successful in 
establishing a clear right to most of the information to which it sought access, but this 
victory was qualified by the respondents' one victory on a question of law, namely that 
relating to the retrospectivity of Part 2, Chapter 4 of PAIA. 
79  Biowatch II (Minority) par 32.  
80  See Biowatch II (Majority) par 26-28.  
81  See Ibid par 10, 12 and 13.  
82  Biowatch II (Minority) par 93. 
 and Biowatch's victory on 
the question on whether it was acting in the public interest. Because the 
majority and minority decisions differed on Biowatch's success against 
Monsanto, they also differed in this regard on the extent to which there had 
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been a departure from the second general principle applicable to costs, as the 
next section shows. In the opinion of Mynhardt J there had in fact been no 
departure from the general rule, while in the view of Poswa J there had been an 
extraordinary departure from the principle in that a successful party had been 
required to pay the costs of an unsuccessful party.  
 
4.3 Decision on costs in the court a quo  
Notwithstanding Dunn AJ's own summary assessment that Biowatch's 
application had met with some degree of success, he decided that no costs 
order against the statutory respondents should be made in favour of Biowatch 
("the first costs order"), and that Biowatch should be ordered to pay the costs of 
Monsanto ("the second costs order"). His reasons for both costs orders were 
contained in and confined to the following paragraph:83
Dunn AJ demonstrated an awareness that he was departing from the second 
generally accepted principle relating to costs and offered three reasons in 
justification: (i) The manner in which Biowatch had formulated its requests for 
information and the relief claimed in the notice of motion – this reason, 
presumably, being associated with the judge's earlier comments as regards the 
vexatious, oppressive and inept nature of Biowatch's conduct; (ii) that 
Biowatch's approach to the matter had compelled the fourth to sixth 
respondents to come to court to protect their interests; and (iii) that the 
arguments presented by these respondents were of great assistance. As it 
 
 
As far as costs are concerned, the general rule in litigation is that the costs should 
follow the result. However, although Biowatch has been partially successful in 
obtaining some of the relief sought, the manner in which some of its requests for 
information were formulated, as well as the manner in which the relief claimed in 
the notice of motion was formulated, has convinced me that it should not be 
granted a costs order in its favour in these circumstances. Furthermore, the 
approach adopted by it compelled Monsanto, Stoneville and D&PL SA to come to 
court to protect their interests. The issues were complex and the arguments 
presented by them were of great assistance. Stoneville and D&PL SA did not seek 
any costs order against the applicant. On behalf of Monsanto its counsel sought 
an order for costs against the applicant. In my view the applicant should be 
ordered to pay Monsanto's costs. No other order as to costs is warranted in the 
circumstances of this case.  
 
                                            
83  Biowatch I par 68.  
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appears from the judgment, these were the parameters that guided the 
exercise of Dunn AJ's discretion as to costs.  
 
On appeal, two disputes of a factual nature relating to Dunn AJ's reasoning on 
the costs award emerged between the majority and minority judgments. Firstly, 
there was disagreement on whether or not Monsanto had in fact been 
compelled to come to court. Mynhardt J simply agreed with Dunn AJ, finding no 
merit in the submissions that Monsanto could or should have engaged the 
statutory respondents and indicated to them which documents it regarded as 
confidential; that Monsanto could have relied on the statutory respondents to 
protect its confidential information, and that Biowatch was under no duty to 
approach Monsanto beforehand to ascertain if it was amendable to the order 
being sought.84Poswa J, on the other hand, regarded it as an "anomaly that the 
Registrar and Monsanto had failed to communicate about Biowatch's request. If 
they had communicated Monsanto could have conveyed its fears regarding the 
protection of confidential information in the custody of the Registrar, who would 
in turn have communicated this to Biowatch. It would therefore not have been 
necessary for Monsanto to join as a party in the application". 85
Secondly, there was a sharp difference of opinion as to whether Dunn AJ had 
in fact taken the constitutional/public interest nature of the litigation into account 
and, related thereto, the "trend" or "principle" or "rule" relating to costs in 
constitutional litigation. From the judgment itself, it appears that Dunn AJ did 
not, but in paragraph 15 of his judgment on the application for leave to appeal 
he maintained that "a failure to expressly articulate all the grounds in favour of 
not making such an order certainly do (sic) not mean that they were not 
considered".
 
 
86 He pointed out that he was acquainted with the case law 
concerning costs in constitutional litigation, not least because he had been 
involved in at least one of them.87
                                            
84  Ibid par 28.  
85  Biowatch II (Minority) par 82.  
86  Quoted in Biowatch II (Minority) par 41.  
87  Democratic Alliance v Masondo NO 2003 (2) SA 413 (CC). 
 He therefore implied that these factors were 
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in fact taken into account, although they did not work in Biowatch's favour. 
However, because he admittedly did not expressly articulate all the grounds 
relating to his decision on costs, what was or was not in his mind at the time he 
made the order became a moot point. In this Biowatch relied on an exchange 
between Dunn AJ and counsel for Monsanto in the proceedings for the 
application for leave to appeal in respect of an affidavit Biowatch had attempted 
to place before the court indicating the effects of an adverse costs order on its 
operations.88
Mynhardt J essentially dismissed the significance of this exchange by holding 
that "I do not think that the impecuniosity of Biowatch, if that is a fact, provides 
a ground or reason for holding that Dunn AJ misdirected himself. To the extent 
that a costs order against an NGO might have a 'chilling' effect that is 
something that is common knowledge".
 In this exchange, Dunn AJ asked counsel for Monsanto if one 
could not take into account the fact that Biowatch was an NGO which needed 
funding from outsiders, to which counsel responded that the judge could have 
taken this into account. Dunn AJ then stated: "But that is something that I did 
not take into account. I must say, you know, at face value I treated the applicant 
as a normal litigant". And later, he stated: "What concerns me is this, did I not, 
where a party comes to Court to protect its constitutional rights, did I not, you 
know, treat that too lightly?" The thrust of counsel's response was to reassure 
the judge that the test was whether he had "judicially applied his mind" to the 
exercise of the discretion and not if another court would come to a different 
decision based on those facts.  
 
89 In contrast, Poswa J analysed this 
exchange, finding in it contradictory moves that at first denied the fact that the 
public interest nature of the litigation was taken into account and then later 
seemed to affirm this.90 In Poswa J's final opinion, Dunn AJ did not take this 
factor into account.91
                                            
88  Both the majority (par 36) and minority (par 40) judgments referred to and produced 
segments of this exchange.  
89  Biowatch II (Majority) par 36.  
90  Biowatch II (Minority) par 41. 
91  Ibid par 42. 
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4.4 Application of the fundamental rules on costs in Biowatch II92
The basis of Biowatch's appeal against the two costs orders to a full bench of 
the Transvaal Provincial Division was that Dunn AJ had misdirected himself in a 
number of respects: Firstly, Biowatch argued that Dunn AJ acted capriciously in 
making the first and second costs orders in that the decision was based on the 
manner in which the relief had been formulated.
  
93 Secondly, it argued that 
Dunn AJ misdirected himself by failing to take relevant considerations into 
account, including the "trend" in judgments delivered by the Constitutional 
Court and the other courts of South Africa not to make costs orders in matters 
in which a party seeks to establish an important constitutional principle or in 
matters where the protection of the environment is relevant.94 As a result of 
these misdirections, it accordingly maintained that the appeal court was entitled 
to determine the issue of costs afresh. As regards the "test" for judicial 
interference in the award of costs by the court a quo, Biowatch maintained that 
the "traditional test" as recently re-formulated by Cloete J in Naylor II applied 
only where the court had followed the general principles applicable to costs. But 
where the trial court had departed from the general rule and had deprived the 
successful party of his costs, "a court of appeal will ordinarily interfere and 
apply its own judgment as to whether or not there are any grounds to depart 
from the general rule".95
                                            
92  This article focuses on how the fundamental rules on costs were applied in the majority 
and minority decisions on appeal. As such, it does not deal with two of the other important 
legal issues raised in the case, namely, whether the appeal was barred by the provisions 
of s 21A of the Supreme Court Act 59 of 1959 (in terms of which an appeal court has a 
discretion to dismiss an appeal if it has no practical effect other than costs); and whether 
the provisions of s 32 of the NEMA were applicable to the judge's discretion. In respect of 
the latter it is my opinion that the provisions of s 32 were in fact applicable and that this in 
itself, on the authority of Swartbooi v Brink (n 51) would have been enough to establish 
that Dunn AJ had misdirected himself as to costs. 
93  Biowatch II (Majority) par 24. 
94  Ibid par 30.  
95  Biowatch II (Majority) par 21. Counsel for Biowatch had obtained this formulation from 
Merber v Merber 1948 (1) SA 446 (A) at 453G–H where Greenberg JA had stated: 
"[W]hen a successful party has been deprived of his costs in the trial court, an appeal court 
will enquire whether there were any grounds for this departure from the general rule and if 
there are no such grounds, then ordinarily it will interfere". 
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4.4.1 The majority decision  
Mynhardt J commenced by emphasising a fairly broad interpretation of the first 
principle applicable to costs. In order to succeed, Mynhardt J held, Biowatch 
needed to show that the court a quo failed to exercise a judicial discretion in 
making the costs orders, affirming a line of authority that stretches back to the 
English decision in Ritter v Godfrey96 where it was said: "The discretion must 
be judicially exercised and therefore there must be some grounds for its 
exercise, for a discretion exercised on no grounds cannot be judicial. If, 
however, there be any grounds, the question of whether they are sufficient is 
entirely for the Judge at the trial and this court cannot interfere with his 
discretion".97 Mynhardt J assumed that "any grounds" in this passage meant 
"any grounds on which a reasonable person could come to the conclusion 
arrived at".98 As such, a judge had a "wide unfettered discretion" to make a 
costs order after taking into account all of the relevant factors or circumstances 
of the case. There was no "normal rule" or "general rule". The mere fact that an 
appellate judge would have given more weight to the grounds did not mean that 
the trial judge had acted arbitrarily, that is, without a judicial discretion.99
Mynhardt J aligned himself with the test for interference in a costs order made 
by a court a quo formulated by Cloete J Naylor II and pointed out that the 
principle that an appeal court will interfere with the exercise of a narrow or 
"true" or "strong" discretion only in limited circumstances had also been 
affirmed by the Constitutional Court in South African Broadcasting Corporation 
Ltd v National Director of Public Prosecutions.
  
 
100
                                            
96  1920 2 KB 47. 
97  Quoted in Biowatch II (Majority) par 21 (my emphasis).  
98  Ibid.  
99  Ibid.  
 Relying on a laconic 
100  2007 (1) SA 523 (CC). He did not point out that the discretion here related to s 173 of the 
Constitution according to which Supreme Court of Appeal and High Courts are required "to 
regulate their own processes". This case concerned an application to televise the 
proceedings of the Shaik trial, and the Constitutional Court, while cautioning that the 
exercise of the powers in s 173 may well not be capable of a single characterisation for 
purposes of determining the correct approach on appeal, found that the nature of the 
discretion the Supreme Court of Appeal was asked to exercise in this particular case was 
a narrow one (par 41). Accordingly, the question was not whether the Constitutional Court 
would have reached a different conclusion on permitting live radio and television 
broadcasting of the proceedings, but if the Supreme Court of Appeal had acted judicially in 
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formulation of the test – as per Cloete J in Bookworks (Pty) Ltd v Greater 
Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan Council101 Mynhardt J held that the 
question was whether Dunn AJ had committed some "demonstrable blunder" or 
reached an "unjustifiable conclusion".102
In applying these principles to the facts in Biowatch II, Mynhardt J firstly 
disposed of the argument advanced by Biowatch that the "traditional test" for 
interference in costs orders, as formulated in Naylor II, applied only where a 
court had followed the general rule that a successful litigant should be awarded 
costs, by pointing out that in Naylor II the Supreme Court of Appeal was dealing 
with a case where the general rule had indeed not been followed, and yet the 
court affirmed the traditional test, rather than holding that it would "ordinarily 
interfere" on the authority of Merber.
 
 
103
In response to Biowatch's argument that Dunn AJ had acted capriciously in 
making the first and second costs orders, Mynhardt J noted that in essence 
Dunn AJ had disapproved of the manner in which the relief was formulated in 
the four letters written by Biowatch and in the notice of motion and had decided 
to deprive Biowatch of its costs against the statutory respondents "as a mark of 
his disapproval". In Mynhardt J's view Dunn AJ was entitled to do so and he 
could find no fault with his decision. 
 He failed, however, to take into account 
the constitutional jurisprudence where the Constitutional Court interfered in the 
costs orders of lower courts without resorting to this test.  
 
104
Mynhardt J also dismissed Biowatch's contentions that Dunn AJ had failed to 
take relevant considerations into account as regards the "trend" relating to 
costs orders in constitutional litigation. Mynhardt J's position was that the 
 He therefore did not consider the 
propriety of this rationale within a constitutional context.  
 
                                                                                                                               
exercising its discretion. It would thus interfere only where the Supreme Court of Appeal 
had not acted judicially, or had based the exercise of its discretion on wrong principles of 
law or a misdirection on the material facts (Ibid). 
101  1999 (4) SA SA 799 (W) at 808B.  
102  Biowatch II (Majority) par 22. 
103  Ibid par 21.  
104  Biowatch II (Majority) par 25. 
T HUMBY  PER/PELJ 2009(12)1 
120/166 
courts' tendency not to make costs orders against parties litigating on the basis 
of an important constitutional principle was a trend and not a "rule" that fettered 
the discretion of the trial judge to make an order as to costs. In this regard he 
relied in particular on Ackermann J's statements in Motsepe105 (where, as 
noted above, the applicant had been unsuccessful in obtaining the 
constitutional relief sought) and rejected Biowatch's reliance on the Sanderson 
case106
4.4.2 Minority decision  
 finding that the dictum here related only to criminal proceedings.  
 
Contrary to Mynhardt J, Poswa J emphasised both the first and second 
principles on costs. He noted that according to the "traditional test" for 
interference in the award of costs by the court of first instance, an appeal court 
will not readily interfere. However, while the trial court has a discretion, this is 
not unlimited, being subject to the general principle stated in Fripp v Gibbon 
1913 AD 354 that 'to the successful party should be awarded his costs'.107 
Acknowledging Cloete J's restatement of the traditional test for judicial 
interference in Naylor II, the judge then emphasised that while the case was a 
good example of how a successful party (in casu the defendant) was denied 
costs contrary to the general principle stated in Fripp v Gibbon, it also illustrated 
the need to indicate reasons why this had been done.108 Poswa J pointed out 
how Cloete J had found that the trial judge in the Naylor matter, Willis J, had 
been acutely aware that he was exercising a discretion as well as the 
parameters thereof. Willis J had justified his decision on costs with reference to 
the nature of the action (that in defamation actions the quantum essentially 
takes the form of a solatium), the motive of the plaintiff (that the plaintiff needed 
to persist with the application in order to vindicate his reputation), and the 
attitude of the defendant in making the without-prejudice tender (that the tender 
contained no acknowledgement that a defamatory statement had been made 
and no apology).109
                                            
105  1997 (2) SA 898 (CC). 
106  See n 53 above.  
107  Biowatch II (Minority) par 23. 
108  Ibid par 29.  
109  Ibid par 28.  
 These, Poswa J found, were substantive reasons as to why 
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there was a departure from one of the two general principles relating to 
costs.110 While Willis J was fully conscious of the fact that he was exercising a 
discretion and gave reasons for his departure from the general rule, "Dunn AJ 
did not, in his judgment, when dealing with costs, mention the question of public 
interest action, and give reasons, therein, why he was disregarding that factor" 
(my emphasis).111
Poswa J comprehensively reviewed the approach towards costs in 
constitutional and public interest litigation in foreign jurisdictions as well as in 
the Constitutional Court, Supreme Court of Appeal and High Courts,
  
 
112 and 
came to the conclusion that the Constitutional Court adopts the trend, in vogue 
in numerous foreign jurisdictions, of not awarding costs against applicants in 
public interest litigation. This approach amounted to more than a "trend" and 
could be characterised as a "flexible rule". 113
Poswa J essentially found that Dunn AJ had done more than depart from this 
"flexible rule" in an unjustifiable manner – he had completely failed to take it 
into account. Poswa J examined the exchange that had taken place between 
Dunn AJ and counsel for Monsanto in respect of Biowatch's affidavit indicating 
the effect of an adverse costs order upon it and found that as a matter of fact 
Dunn AJ had not taken into account that Biowatch was an NGO acting in the 
public interest when making the costs order. The judge therefore concluded: "I 
do not, therefore, agree with the majority judgment that, that omission on Dunn 
AJ's part does not show 'that [he] had committed a demonstrable blunder'. In 
my view, it demonstrates just that".
 
 
114
4.4.3 An assessment  
 
 
While both Mynhardt and Poswa JJ proceeded from the first principle on costs, 
Mynhardt J relied upon it heavily, barely mentioning the second principle and 
                                            
110  Ibid par 29.  
111  Ibid.  
112  Ibid par 43-61.  
113  Ibid par 61.  
114  Ibid par 42.  
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holding that no third principle relating to costs in constitutional litigation had 
been recognised. On the other hand, Poswa J held that the judicial discretion 
as to costs was subject to both the second principle and, evidently, a third 
principle relating to costs in constitutional litigation which had, by now, been 
recognised as a "flexible rule". Quite clearly, these judges held different views 
on the relationship between the first principle and the second and third principle 
(assuming the latter has such a status for this discussion) and it is difficult to 
say who was correct according to the existing law. As noted above, the weight 
of authority lies behind the proposition that the second principle yields to the 
first, but does not indicate the circumstances in which this may occur, while the 
view put forward in Levben Products is that the second principle may be 
departed from only on "good grounds".  
 
However, for Mynhardt J, it is clear that "good grounds" would be equivalent to 
"any rational ground". He was satisfied that Dunn AJ had exercised his 
discretion as to costs judicially because there were some grounds for its 
exercise, which a reasonable person could accept. In the majority opinion, the 
cryptic115
While both judges affirmed the traditional test for interference in costs orders 
(and thereby also the characterisation of costs as broad in the court a quo and 
narrow in the court of appeal) their application of this test to the facts yielded 
different results. Bringing in the test for interference in the exercise of such 
 manner in which Dunn AJ justified his departure from the principle 
that a successful party should be awarded his costs was sufficient. The judicial 
exercise of the discretion did not require that Dunn AJ should have expressly 
taken into account the public interest motive of the litigant and constitutional 
nature of the litigation or justified his departure from the trend toward costs in 
these matters. By contrast, in highlighting cases in which judges had given 
express reasons for their departure from the fundamental rules on costs, 
Poswa J implied that the judicial exercise of a discretion on costs requires, at 
least , taking into account the second and third principle and expressly 
providing substantive reasons when departing from them.  
 
                                            
115  Biowatch II (Majority) par 14.  
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discretion, as formulated by Cloete J, the aspect of the test which seems most 
applicable to the judges' reasoning is the failure by the judge a quo to act for 
"substantial" reasons. Again, for Mynhardt J what counted as a "substantial 
reason" was equated with a reason which a reasonable person could accept, 
viz the "unreasonable" manner in which Biowatch had formulated its requests 
for information and notice of motion. Any rational reason would have sufficed. 
In contrast, Poswa J evidently regarded the reasons Dunn AJ did put forward 
as insufficient and held that his failure both to take into account and to 
expressly justify his departure from the trend toward costs in constitutional 
litigation vitiated the discretion as "judicial". In this view, there are potential 
reasons which a judge should take into account and, where they are relevant, 
he or she should expressly account for failing to apply them in the making of a 
costs order. A "substantial" reason is therefore not simply any rational reason, 
but the reasons one would expect a judge to take into account in the particular 
circumstance.  
 
Neither judge expressly considered the propriety, in a constitutional context, of 
the reasons Dunn AJ did present in justification of his award on costs, in 
particular the propriety of an order that essentially sought to punish Biowatch, 
as a mark of the court's disapproval, for the manner in which they had 
conducted the litigation.  
 
 
5 Reconceptualising the Fundamental Rules on Costs to meet new 
needs in constitutional and/or public interest litigation  
5.1 An unsatisfactory situation  
The fundamental rules on costs currently fail to meet new needs which arise in 
constitutional and/or public interest litigation and the reasons for this are 
essentially four-fold, based on the right of access to justice, the right to equal 
protection and benefit of the law, the need for proportionality, and the 
accountability of the judiciary.  
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5.1.1 Access to justice 
The fundamental rules on costs currently fail to effectively engage with the 
insight that the rules and principles governing costs orders – including security 
for costs – have a critical impact on access to justice. In this regard, the 
discretion on costs differs from the other types of discretion which Greenberg 
JA identified in Ex Parte Neethling and Rex v Zackey, such as an amendment 
of pleadings, the granting of a postponement, or the alteration of a sentence on 
this ground. In the context of environmental litigation, Lord Justice Brooke has 
written that there are three immediately obvious obstacles to public access to 
the courts: "The costs of the courts (in terms of high court fees); the cost of 
lawyers (in terms of even higher professional fees) and, above all, the risk of 
having to pay one's opponent's costs if one loses, and the uncertainty at the 
outset of litigation as to how large those costs will be".116 Arguments based on 
the so-called "chilling" effect adverse costs orders may have on public interest 
and constitutional litigation are in fact understated because these three 
obstacles, as recognised in a number of the cases and academic articles cited 
by Poswa J in his minority judgment,117 do more than "chill" such actions – they 
kill them at the root, because they deter the individuals and public interest 
organisations that would otherwise institute an action from even arriving at the 
court's doors out of fear that the financial burden of the litigation will effectively 
destroy them.118
Further, the potential of an adverse costs order can be used in a way that 
undermines the objectives underlying the relaxation of locus standi, as has 
occurred in respect of constitutional litigation by virtue of section 38 of the 
Constitution and in environmental litigation in particular by section 32(1) of the 
 In this instance the use of the word "chill" is a euphemism that 
covers the true effect of the court's application of costs principles and rules.  
 
                                            
116  See Brooke (n 2) 345.  
117  See, for instance, the sources cited in par 45 and 46 and the decisions in Coalition of 
Citizens for a Charter Challenge v Metropolitan Authority (1993) 122 NSR (2d) 1; 103 DLR 
(4) 409 (SCTD) and British Columbia (Minister of Forests) v Okanjan Indian Band [2003] 3 
SCR (SCC).  
118 At a workshop on public interest environmental litigation held at Wits University during June 
2008 and at which a number of the larger environmental NGOs were represented, this 
sentiment was expressed very strongly.  
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National Environmental Management Act 107 of 1998. In Wildlife Society of 
Southern Africa v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism,119
It was not certain that to afford locus standi to a body such as the [Wildlife Society 
of Southern Africa] in circumstances such as these would open the floodgates to a 
torrent of frivolous or vexatious litigation against the State by cranks or 
busybodies. Neither was it certain, given the exorbitant costs of Supreme Court 
litigation, that, should the law be so adapted, cranks and busybodies would flood 
the Courts with vexatious or frivolous applications against the State. Should they 
be tempted to do so, an appropriate order of costs would soon inhibit their litigious 
ardour.
 a case 
decided before locus standi in environmental matters was broadened through 
the right to environment in section 24 of the Constitution, case law that invoked 
this right as the basis for standing and section 32(1), the Pickering J stated:  
 
120
Based on this quotation, one has to wonder if the courts, at least in some 
quarters, view costs orders as a "weapon" that can be invoked against their oft-
quoted fear of opening the "floodgates" of litigation.
 
 
121
There is little point in opening the doors to the courts if litigants cannot afford to 
come in. The general rule in litigation that "costs follow the event" is in point. The 
fear, if unsuccessful, of having to pay the costs of the other side (often a 
government instrumentality or wealthy private corporation) with devastating 
consequences to the individual or environmental group bringing the action, must 
inhibit the taking of cases to court. In any event, if will be a factor that looms large 
in any consideration to initiate litigation.
 But as Mr Justice 
Toohey, a member of the High Court of Australia, said during his address to a 
conference of the National Environmental Law Association in 1989:  
 
122
In Napier v Barkhuizen
 
 
123 the Constitutional Court reaffirmed its position on the 
importance and purpose of section 34 of the Constitution,124
                                            
119 1996 (3) SA 1095 (Tks). 
120 At 1106F–G.  
121  See also the remarks by Ackermann J in Motsepe v Commissioner for Inland Revenue 
1997 (2) SA 898 (CC), 1997 (6) BCLR 692 par 30.  
122  Quoted in Brooke (n 2) 346.  
123  2007 (5) SA 323 (CC), 2007 (7) BCLR 691.  
124  S 34 provides that "[e]veryone has the right to have any dispute that can be resolved by 
the application of law decided in a fair public hearing before a court or, where appropriate, 
another independent and impartial tribunal or forum". 
 the constitutional 
right arguably most pertinent to the issue of access to justice. They held that 
the orderly and fair resolution of disputes by courts (or other independent and 
impartial tribunals) is fundamental to the stability of an orderly society and 
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indeed vital to a society that is based on the rule of law.125 Further (as they 
were testing the constitutionality of a contractual provision) they held that 
section 34 "not only reflects the foundational values that underlie our 
constitutional order, it also constitutes public policy".126 One could contend that 
as the fundamental rules on costs omit to provide certainty that the nature of 
the litigation and the position of the litigant will be considered when a judge 
exercises his discretion on costs, this constitutes an infringement of section 34, 
and there would be no bar (as was the case in Napier) to subjecting the 
fundamental rules on costs – as law of general application – to a limitation 
analysis. Dugard has already shown the extent to which there is a demand for 
access to justice (and the extent to which this is not being met by direct access 
to the Constitution Court).127 And in a recent paper, Heywood and Hassim have 
pointed to the disjuncture between the realisation of section 35 rights and the 
progressive erosion of section 34 rights, as measured in terms of funds directed 
to criminal and civil matters respectively by the Legal Aid Board.128 They have 
also argued convincingly that "unless the need for justice and remedies for 
injustice are met by the courts and the law, there will be negative 
consequences for the popular legitimacy of the courts and indeed the 
Constitution itself".129
5.1.2 Equal protection and benefit of the law  
 
 
In the light of all this, it is surely time that the courts acknowledged the linkages 
between costs and access to justice and reformed the laws on costs in a 
manner that favours access to justice rather than undermines it, as would 
appear to have been the case in the Biowatch matter.  
 
If section 34 not only reflects the foundational constitutional values but also 
reflects public policy, then the same must hold true of section 9(1) of the 
Constitution – the right of equality before the law and the right to equal 
                                            
125  Ibid par 31. 
126  Ibid par 33. 
127  See Dugard 2006 SAJHR 261.  
128  Heywood and Hassim "Remedying the maladies" par 25. 
129  Ibid par 34.  
T HUMBY  PER/PELJ 2009(12)1 
127/166 
protection and benefit of the law. But unless there are mechanisms in the 
process of litigation whereby the inequality of contending parties can be taken 
into account, the law benefits only those who are most powerful and well-
resourced to invoke its protection. The Biowatch matter is typical in this regard. 
Biowatch depended upon advocates and attorneys willing to offer their services 
pro bono or had to undertake public fundraising to secure the services of an 
able legal representative, yet was pitted against an assembly of lawyers – 
being the very best that money could buy – representing the government and 
each of the biotechnology companies; a situation Lord Brooke has described as 
"a cadre of Goliaths with their clubs and battle axes" in one corner, and "a 
squad of Davids, with their slings and peashooters" in the other.130 If the trial 
judge is to make a costs award that is "fair and just between the parties" (to 
adopt De Villiers' formulation in Fripp v Gibbon), then this requires closer 
regard to the actual status of the parties, the effect of an adverse costs order 
upon them and the differing roles they play in upholding a constitutional 
democracy. An NGO such as Biowatch fulfills an important constitutional 
function in both representing and encouraging a diversity of views on the issue 
of GMOs in South Africa. Is it in the interests of a constitutional democracy that 
an adverse costs order can be both made and upheld against Biowatch (or any 
other similarly situated institution) where it raises an important constitutional 
issue and is at least partially or even substantially successful, and the effect of 
that order is to end or at least substantially strain its ability to function?131
Further, there seems to be little appreciation of the debt owed by society to the 
individuals and organisations who institute litigation, not for their own personal 
financial gain, but in the interest of a significant section of the public (if not the 
public as a whole) and who through their success – and sometimes even their 
failure – secure a benefit for those who had no part in the litigation. In fact, in 
 I think 
not.  
 
                                            
130  Brooke (n 2) 344.  
131  See in this regard also Heywood and Hassim (n 127) on the effects of the decision in NM v 
Smith 2007 (5) SA 250 (CC). Although the applicants were ultimately successful in 
upholding their constitutional rights to privacy and dignity, this took place "at great personal 
cost to them and financial cost to the [Aids Law Project]". 
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other jurisdictions the inherent unfairness of this situation has been recognised 
and attempts to remedy it through making funds available through other means, 
predominantly legal aid, have been made.132
5.1.3 Proportionality  
 However, given the de facto 
situation regarding legal aid in South Africa, a duty is imposed on the courts to 
do everything in their power to facilitate access and, towards this end, to reduce 
the burden of litigation on poor people and poorly-resourced organisations.  
 
Proportionality is a value implicit in the Constitution. It is specifically associated 
with the test for limitations of rights,133 but has over time been applied to 
discretions exercisable in other areas of law.134 Proportionality, in essence, 
requires a balancing of different interests135 and, as Mokgoro and Sachs 
pointed out in the Bel Porto case, a specific understanding of justifiability, i.e. 
one which requires "more than a mere rational connection between the reasons 
and the decision …",136
                                            
132  See the Brooke's (n 2) 347-349 description of the English Access to Justice Act 1999 and 
the work of the Legal Services Commission as well as Preston 1991 JELL 61-62.  
133  S v Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC), 1995 (6) BCLR 665 par 105. 
134  For instance, the use of force, in terms of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 in 
effecting an arrest (see Ex Parte Minister of Safety and Security: In re S v Walters 2002 (7) 
BCLR 663 (CC)) and the right to just administrative action (see in particular Bel Porto 
School Governing Body v Premier of the Province, Western Cape 2002 (3) SA 265 (CC), 
2002 (9) BCLR 891 par 162 ff).  
135  Makwanyane (n 132) par 104, Bel Porto (n 130) par 162.  
136  Bel Porto (n 133) par 164-165. As the comments of the minority in this case make clear, a 
proportionality test is particularly suited to considering the question of costs on appeal 
because it effects a compromise between a test based purely on a rational connection and 
one where the judiciary substitutes its decision for that of the decision-maker of first 
instance.  
 but rather a substantiation of necessity and suitability in 
the light of certain factors. According to the present understanding of "judicial 
discretion", at least as proposed by the majority in Biowatch II in the making of 
a costs award, one rational reason is as good as any another. Thus, in the 
reasoning of the court a quo, the first and second costs orders were justified on 
the basis that Biowatch had acted improperly in the manner in which it had 
formulated its relief. The unarticulated moral foundation of this reason is the 
integrity of the legal process and the time-worn professional rules that have 
developed around "fairness" in litigation. Judges are steeped in the ethos of 
these rules and guard them vigilantly, such that what would appear to a layman 
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as a minor error or oversight in any court document would be viewed in a very 
serious light by a judge and could justify the matter being thrown out of court. 
These rules are not unimportant because they are closely bound up with the 
integrity of the legal system as a means of resolving disputes between different 
parties in a manner that is "fair". However, since the advent of democracy even 
these rules are subject to the overriding objectives of the Constitution to create 
a society that is open, democratic and diverse, in which ordinary people are 
able, through the courts, to vindicate their constitutional rights. The necessity 
and suitability of this reason should therefore be subjected to scrutiny in the 
light of these broader considerations.  
 
5.1.4 Accountability of the judiciary  
The final reason is that currently the fundamental rules on costs do not 
adequately capture the accountability of the judiciary to fundamental 
constitutional norms and standards, which includes the norm of accountability 
itself. In the South African Broadcasting Corporation case, the Constitutional 
Court stated: "The foundational constitutional values of accountability, 
responsiveness and openness apply to the functioning of the judiciary as much 
as to other branches of government".137
                                            
137  South African Broadcasting Incorporation v National Director of Public Prosecutions 2007 
(1) SA 523 par 32.  
 The present formulation of the nature 
of the judicial discretion in awards of costs does not adequately specify whether 
that discretion is fettered or unfettered and, more importantly, if fettered by 
principles such as the second principle on costs or a principle on costs in 
constitutional and/or public interest litigation, the circumstances in which such 
principles can be departed from and the standards of justification that then 
apply.  
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5.2 Suggestions for possible reform  
The parameters for possible reform have already been foreshadowed in my 
critique above.138
In conclusion, in making costs orders courts wield considerable power. This is a 
power that operates "in advance," in the sense that it is a critical factor in the 
decision to launch litigation. Courts should exercise this power in a manner that 
 It seems sound to maintain that a judicial discretion to award 
costs inheres in the judge of the first instance, on the basis that he or she is 
well positioned to evaluate the relative success of the parties in the light of their 
overall behaviour and conduct in the court. However, this discretion is not 
unfettered and is subject to both the traditionally recognised second principle 
on costs as well as the principle that has emerged in the context of 
constitutional litigation, which is that where a party has raised an important 
constitutional principle, an adverse costs order should generally not be made. 
In exceptional circumstances, it may even be justified to order the successful 
party to pay such a party's costs. These considerations are all the more 
compelling where the litigation is of a public interest nature. A departure from 
either the second or "third" principle on costs should be justifiable in the light of 
the values, norms and standards of the Constitution and not merely on the 
basis of rationality. Moreover, in order to demonstrate accountability to such 
norms, values and standards, a judge's reasons for departure must be set out 
expressly. The traditional categorisation of costs as one which vests the court 
of appeal with only a narrow discretion for interference should be expressly re-
evaluated in the light of the significant role that costs orders play in access to 
justice and to account for the de facto practice in the Constitutional Court in 
certain cases. A test formulated more along the lines of a proportionality 
analysis may be more appropriate. At the very least, the reference to 
"substantial reasons" in the existing test should be taken to refer to reasons 
which are justifiable in the light of the value framework established by the 
Constitution.  
 
                                            
138  I am assuming that the power to effect such reform lies with the courts' power to develop 
the common law so as to promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights, as per 
s 39(2) of the Constitution.  
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is conscious of its effects, particularly of its differential effects on different 
classes of litigant, and should be held accountable for their costs decisions in 
the light of constitutional values, norms and standards.  
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